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IN THE EUROPEAN EMISSION TRADING SYSTEM1
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Abstract. In this article, we analyse the effects of the carousel value-added tax fraud in the

European carbon market and the legislative measures that the EU Member States could adopt
to deal with this phenomena. We use a computable general equilibrium model, called
GTAP-E and the version 6 of the GTAP database to evaluate the economy-wide and terms of
trade effects. The policy test has been designed for five European countries: Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the United Kingdom. According to our findings, the
legislative measures aimed to remove the VAT fraud in the European Emission Trading
System will have positive effects in terms of GDP and welfare in the selected EU Member
States.
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1.

Introduction

By signing the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, a number of industrialized countries, the so-called
Annex 1 countries, committed themselves to reduce the greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions
relative to their 1990 levels (UN, 1998). Different “flexibility mechanisms” were provided in
order to allow emission reductions to be reallocated among Annex 1 countries. The “Emission
Trading” (ET) and the “Joint Implementation” (JI) mechanisms aimed at reallocating the
burden of the emission reductions among Annex 1 countries. In contrast, the “Clean
Development” mechanism” (CDM) would allow Annex 1 countries to fund emission
reductions in non-Annex 1 countries.
Therefore, in 2000 the EU Commission launched the European Climate Change Programme
(ECCP), a continuous multi-stakeholder consultative process which serves to identify costeffective ways for the EU to meet its Kyoto commitments, to set priorities for action, and to
implement concrete measures. One of the main elements of this programme was the
establishment of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), regulated by
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 13 October 2003
(EC, 2003) and, recently, amended by Directive 2009/29/CE of the European Parliament and
Council of 23 April 2009 (EC, 2009). The EU ETS is a cap-and-trade system for transactions
of European Unit Allowances (EUAs) and is implemented as a downstream system; i.e. the
users (rather than the producers and importers of fossil fuels) will be obliged to hold emission
allowances. Only CO2 of the six greenhouse gases included in the Kyoto protocol is subject
to the ETS.
There is a fundamental difference between the EU ETS and the emissions trading scheme as
envisaged under the Kyoto Protocol. In the latter case, emissions trading is to occur between
the Parties to the protocol at the level of the States. Under the EU ETS trading is to occur
between individual emitters, which comprise 11,428 installations in the EU Member States.
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Therefore, only installations belonging to one of four broad sectors (energy activities,
production and processing of ferrous metals, mineral industry, pulp and paper), which are
listed in the Directive and which exceed a sector-specific threshold, are subjected to
emissions trading. In this regime, the EU Member States have three important tasks. First,
they have to decide the quantity of emissions that should be allocated to the installations
participating in the ETS. Second, they have to draw up a list of all installations which are
subject to emissions trading. Third, they have to decide how to allocate the total quantity to
individual installations. The Directive sets some general rules according to which the
allocation has to be made, but there is substantial scope for national priorities. These
decisions have to be set down in a national allocation plan (NAP).
The EU ETS started on 1 January 2005 and is being implemented in three main stages. The
first trading phase– which has been nicknamed the “warming-up phase” or ‘learning phase’ –
covers the years 2005–2007. The second phase runs from 2008 to 2012 and see the
introduction of new industrial sectors, such as glass and petrochemical production. The third
phase, due to start in 2013 and will run until 2020, will require an increased proportion of
installations to buy emissions allowances via auction rather than receive free allocation. This
phase will also include the abolition of the national allocation plans and adoption instead of a
centralised emissions cap. The literature on the EU-ETS is by now very rich (i.e. Endres et
al., 2005; Betz et al., 2006; Kemfert et al., 2006; Eichner et al., 2009; Stevanato, 2006) and
different aspects have been covered: efficiency, effectiveness, environmental and
distributional consequences.
If on the hand the EU ETS has grown in size and values, more than 11,000 installations in
different 30 countries (the 27 EU Member States and Iceland, Lichtenstein and Norway) and
was worth EUR 103 billion in 2009; on the other hand, the past two years have seen
value-added-tax (VAT) carousel fraud emerges as major threats to the EU ETS market
(Estrada et al., 2010; Kogels, 2010; Nield et al., 2011; Wolf, 2011). In more details, the
3

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2012

3

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 726 [2012]

carousel fraud in EAUs is a form of “missing trader fraud”, well known in the trade of goods.
Fraudulent traders, making use of stolen VAT identification numbers, buy carbon credits
tax-free in one EU Member State, sell them in another Member State at a markup by
including VAT. After one, or more transactions, they disappear without having paid the VAT
to the fisc. It is estimated that up to 90% of the volume of the market for tradable emission
rights was caused by fraudulent activities, leading to a loss of tax revenues of approximately
EUR 5 billion.
Although there is by now a flourishing literature on the VAT carousel fraud in the EU ETS,
less attention has been paid to the economic evaluation of this phenomena. In fact, despite its
relevance, this issue has not been systematically addressed in this emerging literature. The
present paper stands as a novel research that aims at evaluating the the economy-wide and
terms of trade effects of the EU ETS VAT fraud and, in particular, examines the cost (in
terms of welfare loss) reduction that may be obtained by the establishment of tax law adopted
by the EU and its Member States to eliminate the phenomena.
We use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the quantitative impact
assessment. A CGE model describes an economy in equilibrium with endogenously
determined relative prices and quantities. Whereas most empirical approaches study the
policy effects under a ceteris paribus condition, CGE models allow for other variables to
change as well. They incorporate factors markets, commodities markets and external trade
markets. Interactions amongst these different markets are taken into account. Furthermore, as
we use a general equilibrium multi-sectorial and multi-regional trade model, we can take
account of the important interactions between changes in fuel prices, fuel and factor
substitution, and therefore we can evaluate the macroeconomic effects, in terms of trade,
GDP and welfare, of policy change in a more realistic fashion than by using partial
equilibrium analysis. An assessment of the usefulness of CGE models for policy analysis can
be found in Shoven et al. (1992). More specifically, we use in this article a modified version
4
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of the GTAP-E model by McDougall et al. (2007) and the version 6 GTAP database
(Dimaranan et al., 2006). This model has been widely used for the analysis of emission
trading (i.e. Nijkamp et al., 2005; Dagoumas et al., 2006; Kemfert et al., 2006).
The policy experiment has been designed to simulate the VAT fraud in the European carbon
market. We first simulate a domestic emission trading in the countries where data on VAT
fraud are available, which are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the United
Kingdom; then we simulate the lost of tax revenues due to VAT fraud in the carbon market
for these countries. Our findings show that the existence of the VAT fraud in the EU ETS
implies GDP and welfare loss. Also the welfare loss is much more higher than the VAT fraud
value.

This means that the European countries would benefit from the application of

legislative measures, such as the reverse charge, aimed to eliminate the VAT fraud in the
carbon market.
The paper is organized as follows: the second section explains the VAT carousel fraud
phenomena. The third section reports the quantitative impact assessment that allows of
evaluating the effects of the VAT fraud in the EU ETS. The fourth section discusses the
legislative measures aimed to eliminate the risks that VAT fraud will proliferate in the EU
carbon market. In the last section we draw concluding remarks.

2.

The VAT fraud phenomenon

Carousel fraud is nothing more than stealing VAT from the tax authorities. It all boils down
to charging VAT on sales and collecting this VAT from customers. These amounts are than
embezzled instead of being paid to the tax authorities.
Carousel fraud takes advantage of the workings of the VAT scheme to hit the system itself.
At the heart of each carousel fraud is the so-called “missing trader”: this is a company
controlled by the “ringmaster” (the mastermind behind the fraud). Carousel fraud in not
limited to trade in tangible goods (mobile phones, computer equipment, perfumes, and other
5
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high value, low volume goods, due to their ease of transportation and the high VAT revenues
that can be generated from them); intangibles can also be used to set up a VAT carousel
(Wolf, 2011).
A typical example would be one in which a company (X, or missing trader), registered for
VAT in any Member State, acquires goods from another company of another Member State
(Y) and then sells them to a company located in the same area (Z). As the first operation
constitutes an intra-Community transaction, it is exempt from VAT, and the purchaser (X)
does not incur any VAT from the seller (Y). However, the subsequent transfer to the
company residing in the same Member State (Z) constitutes a supply of goods liable and non
exempt, and the selling company (X) charges the VAT to the purchaser (Z). Thus, having
charging VAT on the internal operation, the selling company (X) quickly disappears or
declares itself insolvent without paying its dues to the Treasury, fraudulently obtaining the
amount of VAT due. For its part, the purchaser (Z) subsequently applies to deduct the VAT,
with the consequent loss to the corresponding Treasury. VAT fraud is difficult to detect and
prosecute. In the case of carousel fraud, the crime is quick to execute and leaves little
evidence. The crime is often embedded within a complex web of transactions, and therefore
proof of fraudsters’ failure to surrender VAT is difficult to obtain and involves sifting
through a large amount of documentary evidence (Nield et al., 2011).
Carousel fraud is a serious problem imposing a threat to government income of EU countries.
Although large individual fraud cases are discovered now and then, it is not clear exactly how
much the EU countries lose on carousel fraud each year. In 2009, the European Commission
published a study on the VAT gap in the EU countries during the period 2000-2006. This
VAT gap was calculated as the difference between the theoretical VAT liability for the
economy as a whole and the accrued VAT receipts in a given year. In the report produced by
Reckon LLP,

following a

study commissioned by the European Commission,

Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union, the yearly EU-wide VAT gap is
6
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estimated to range around EUR 100 billion. This figure does not represent the actual level of
fraud, as it also includes losses as a result of tax avoidance structures and regular
insolvencies. However, it does seem to provide an upper limit for the losses as a result of
VAT fraud including carousel fraud.
The nature of emission rights makes carbon market a perfect tool for the execution of fraud.
In particular, the potential for large trading volumes together with their intangible nature
enables quick operations with very large quantities and, hence, allows the theft of huge sums
of money. Through (electronic) exchanges, carbon credits can be traded instantly avoiding
the cost and delay involved in physical delivery (Wolf, 2011).
The carousel fraud in emission trading is a relatively simple form of “missing trader fraud”:
fraudulent traders, making use of stolen VAT identification numbers, buy carbon credits taxfree in one EU Member State, sell them in another Member State at a markup by including
VAT and then (after one or more transactions, including those with bona fide traders)
disappear without having paid the VAT to the Treasury of the country in which the sale was
made (Kogels, 2010). By trading emissions allowances via a series of “carousels”, the
amount of VAT that can be fraudulently acquired is increased each time the allowances are
circulated between this carousel of conspirator companies.
Sometimes transactions were apparently concluded at a loss. It did not matter, as the real
profit was the embezzled VAT. With tax percentages ranging 15% and 25%, the VAT offered
a comfortable profit margin. The missing trader’s only interest was to make as much trade as
possible. As a result, it created a situation where you have a party that is willing to buy at
relatively high prices and sell at relatively low prices. In a electronic marketplace, such a
party can generate huge trading volumes in the blink of an eye (Nield et al., 2011;
Wolf, 2011).
VAT fraud on the EU-ETS was first suspected due to an unprecedented rise in EU emissions
allowance (EUA) spot trading volumes towards the end of 2008. This peaked on June 2nd
7
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2009, when a record 19,8 million metric tons of CO2 was traded on the Bluenext spot
exchange (the largest carbon spot exchange in Europe). It appeared that allowances for
immediate delivery were purchased by a company with little business activity and few assets,
and VAT charged to other companies without its subsequent declaration. Rumors that these
volumes were being driven by VAT carousel fraud prompted Bluenext to close its spot
exchange. Before allowing the exchange to reopen, the French authorities imposed a zerorated VAT status on domestic trades of emission allowances. It estimated that up to 90% of
the volume of the market for tradable emission rights was caused by fraudulent activities,
leading to a loss of tax revenues of approximately EUR 5 billion for a number of EU Member
States (Nield et al., 2011; Wolf, 2011).

3.

Quantitative impact assessment

In this study we use the GTAP-E model, developed by Burniaux and Truong (2002), in the
version revised by McDougall and Golub (2007).
The GTAP-E model is a comparative static, multi-commodity, multi-region CGE model with
the assumptions of perfect competition, market equilibrium and open economy. Furthermore,
the GTAP-E model incorporates energy substitution, carbon emissions from the combustion
of fossil fuels as well as a full account of the carbon tax revenues and a more specific
treatment of carbon emission trading into the standard GTAP model. As the GTAP-E model
has bee widely used for environmental policy analysis and as the mathematical structure of
the GTAP-E model is very complex including a large number of equations, this section aims
to provide a concise description of the modelling framework. More details on the original
GTAP model can be found in Hertel (1997); whereas a description of the GTAP-E model and
its applications can be found in Burniaux and Truong (2002) and McDougall and Golub
(2007). Also we discuss here data calibration, policy experiments and results for the
quantitative impact assessment.
8
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3.1 Model
On the consumption side, there is a representative household in region r, whose
Cobb-Douglas utility function allocates expenditures between private consumption (C),
government consumption (G) and savings expenditure (S) as follows:
α

α

α

U r = C r C ,r Gr G , r S r S , r

(1)

with αC,r, αG,r and αS,r income shares and αC,r + αG,r + αS,r = 1.
The constrained optimizing behavior of the household in region r for private consumption is
represented by a non-homothetic Constant Difference of Elasticity (CDE) expenditure
function for the set of goods and services. A Cobb-Douglas sub-utility function is employed
for government spending.

In this case the expenditure shares are constant across all

commodities. Private and government consumption are split in a series of alternative
composite Armington aggregates (Armington, 1969). Figure 1 and 2 show the consumption
structures.

Figure 1. GTAP-E government purchases (Burniaux et al., 2002).
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Figure 2. GTAP-E household private purchases (Burniaux et al., 2002).
Savings are exhausted on investment and capital markets are assumed to be in equilibrium
only at the global level. In fact, a hypothetical world bank collects savings from all regions
and allocates investments so as to achieve equality of changes in expected future rates of
return:
(2)
where

and

are the percentage change, respectively, in region’s rate of return and

global rate of return.
On the production side, the producers receive payments for selling consumption goods to the
private households and the government, intermediate inputs to other producers and
investment goods to the savings sector. Under the zero profit assumption employed, these
revenues must be precisely exhausted on expenditures for intermediate inputs and primary
factors of production. The nested production technology exhibits constant returns to scale and
every sector produces a single output. The technology is simplified by employing the
Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functional form:
10
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(3)
where, in region r, yi,r is the production of the good i, xj,r is the input j, θj is a non-negative
n

parameter, with

∑θ

j

= 1 , and σ is the elasticity of substitution. In more details, we have the

j =1

Leontief functional form between value added (including energy inputs) and all other inputs
(Figure 3). Next, the energy composite is then combined with capital to produce an energycapital composite, which is in turn combined with other primary factors in a value-addedenergy (VAE) nest through a CES structure. The energy commodities are first separated into
‘electricity’ and ‘non-electricity’ groups. Some degree of substitution is allowed within the
non-electricity group as well as between the electricity and the non-electricity groups
(Figure 4). Both intermediate and final products from different regions are considered to be
imperfectly substitutable with each other (Armington, 1969).

Figure 3. Standard GTAP-E production structure (Burniaux et al., 2002).
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Figure 4. GTAP-E Capital-Energy composite structure (Burniaux et al., 2002).
All factor inputs (land, labor, capital and natural resources) are assumed to be fully employed
and immobile across regions. Capital and labor are perfectly mobile across sectors and,
hence, they earn the same market return regardless of where they are employed; land and
natural resources are sluggish to adjust and their returns may differ across sectors. Every
economy also includes government interventions. All taxes levied in the economy always
accrue to the regional household.
In GTAP-E, CO2 emissions are derived from energy volume data through fixed coefficients.
Coefficients are fuel specific, but not region or sector specific. In calculating the emissions of
CO2 it is assumed that every use of fossil energy goods leads to CO2 emissions except for the
use of crude oil by refineries to produce petroleum products. Only when these petroleum
products are used (combusted) is CO2 emitted to the atmosphere. For the rest, no account is

12
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taken of energy goods used as non-energy feedstocks. Changes in regional CO2 emissions
are calculated as the changes in CO2-weighted changes in domestic production of fuels plus
changes in CO2-weighted imports minus changes in CO2 weighted exports of fuels.
CO2 reduction policies can be implemented in GTAP-E through taxes and (tradable) quota. In
the model, taxes and quota are completely equivalent, i.e., given a certain reduction target,
CO2 taxes are identical to CO2 permit prices. Because both tax revenues and the revenues of
the sale of permits are directly transferred to the regional household, there are also no
differences in wealth effects between the two policy instruments. GTAP-E offers the
possibility for regions to engage in emissions trading (international and domestic). The
international emissions trading can take place within any group of countries or regions, the
only precondition is that each of the regions in an emissions trading group has a fixed CO2
quota. Furthermore, we allow the sectors of each region to trade in emissions with each other,
but not to trade with other sectors in a different region. Within the emissions trading group
(region or sector), the prices of CO2 emissions and marginal abatement costs are equalized. If
on the one hand, the domestic emission trading will result in a uniform marginal abatement
cost (MAC) across all trading sectors for each region, but the MAC will be different for
different regions; on the other hand, the international emission trading will result in a uniform
MAC across all the trading sectors and regions. The monetary values of the international
transfers of emissions permits are credited or debited to the regional income account.
The macroeconomic accounting identity that must be respected by the model is that the
national savings (Sr) minus investment (Ir) is identically equal to the net exports (NXr), that
is:
Sr-Ir=NXr

(4)

As global exports (X) need to be equal to global imports (M) such that

(5)
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global investment will be equal to global savings by Walras’ law:

(6)
3.2 Data calibration
The GTAP-E model is calibrated using the version 6 of the GTAP data base, which consists
of 57 commodities/sectors and 87 regions, including the 27 European Member states
(Dimaranan et al., 2006). The GTAP database is a cross-country data of international trade
flows and national input-output tables. All the information in the data base is reported in
values converted to US dollars adjusted to year 2001 values. The regional and sectoral
aggregation used for this study is shown in Table 1. The GTAP data base has been integrated
by CO2 emissions data provided by Ludena (2007), that transformed the CO2 emissions data
(Lee, 2002) into a database for use in the GTAP-E model.

3.3 Policy experiment and results
The policy experiment has been specifically designed to simulate the VAT fraud in the
European carbon market.
We first simulate domestic emission trading for those countries we have data on the VAT
fraud, which are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
Following Kemfert et al. (2006), we apply the “Business-as-Usual ” (BaU) or reference
emissions for the period up to 2007 for each of the sectors. These are then compared with the
emissions caps as defined by the EU-ETS. We shock the emissions of each designated
trading sector in each region by the projected percentage change to satisfy the NAP
requirements as reported in Table 2. We allow all designated sectors of each region with a
NAP allocation to trade in emissions with each other. For non-NAP sectors we assume that
there is no abatement cost. This means that their emissions levels will be determined

14
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endogenously within the model, according to the production and relative price relationships
between these sectors and the NAP sectors.

Table 1. Categorization of regions and sectors
Regions
aut
bel
dnk
fin
fra
deu
gbr
grc
irl
ita
lux
nld
prt
esp
swe
bgr
cyp
cze
hun
mlt
pol
rom
svk
svn
est
lva
ltu
row

Description
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
United Kingdom
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Hungary
Malta
Poland
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Rest of World

Sectors
coa
oil
gas
omn
tex
wap
ppp
p_c
crp
nmm
i_s
nfm
fmp
mvh
ele
ome
omf
ely
wtr
cns
roe

Description
Coal
Oil
Gas
Minerals nec
Textiles
Wearing apparel
Paper products, publishing
Petroleum, coal products
Chemical, rubber, plastic prod
Mineral products nec
Ferrous metals
Metals nec
Metals products
Motor vehicles and parts
Electronic equipment
Machinery and equipment nec
Manufactures nec
Electricity
Water
Construction
Rest of the economy

15
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Table 2. Percentage deviation of emissions from projected level for period 2005-2007 according to the NAP*.

Belgium France Germany
United Kingdom Italy
Netherlands
Minerals nec
-5.3
-8.1
-0.4
-5.7
-1.7
-7.8
Textiles
-5.3
-2.2
-2.5
-7.8
Wearing apparel
-5.3
-2.2
-2.9
-7.8
Paper products, publishing
-5.3
-1
-3.3
-3.4
-7.8
Petroleum, coal products
-5.3
-2.8
-2.6
-0.9
-7.8
Chemical, rubber, plastic prod
-5.3
-8.1
-0.4
-5.7
-1.7
-7.8
Mineral products nec
-5.3
-8.1
-0.4
-5.7
-1.7
-7.8
Ferrous metals
-5.3 -10.3
-0.5
-18.4
-4.2
-7.8
Metals nec
-5.3 -10.3
-0.5
-18.4
-4.2
-7.8
Metals products
-5.3 -10.3
-0.5
-18.4
-4.2
-7.8
Motor vehicles and parts
-5.3
-2.2
-3.3
-7.8
Electronic equipment
-5.3
-2.2
-2.9
-7.8
Machinery and equipment nec
-5.3
-2.2
-2.9
-7.8
Manufactures nec
-5.3
-2.2
-2.9
-7.8
Electricity
-27.4
-0.4
-3.1
-8.7
-5.5
-7.8
Water
-5.3
-2.2
-2.9
-7.8
Construction
-5.3
-2.2
-2.9
-7.8
* No emissions shock has been applied for the shaded areas.
Source: Kemfert et al. (2006).

Subsequently, we simulate that the VAT fraud will reduce the indirect tax revenues to
government. The VAT evasion associated with the EU-ETS has been estimated in a total of
approximately €5 billion in lost tax revenue in several countries. However, experienced
market analysts argue that, based on the actual volume of asset transactions in the market and
prevailing prices, the VAT fraud could not have reached that sum. In fact, on the basis of the
available data, we calculate that the VAT fraud is almost €2 billion. Table 3 reports the VAT
evasion in the carbon market by country in US dollars.

Table 3. VAT carousel fraud in the carbon market
Region
Belgium
France
Germany
United Kingdom
Italy
Netherlands

$ millions
108
214
1166
65
686
411
16
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Table 4 shows the overall macroeconomic effects of the VAT carousel fraud in the carbon
market. Compared to the domestic emission trading scenario, the VAT fraud will bring losses
in terms of GDP and welfare, but the effects will be positive in terms of trade. As the VAT
fraud implies a decrease in the indirect tax revenues that accrue to the regional household, the
private and government consumption will decrease leading to negative change for the GDP.
Furthermore, if on the one hand, the decrease in the domestic demand (private and
government) will reduce the imports; on the other hand, the output supply excess will be
exported leading to positive trade balance. Usually, the effects on trade balance yield
opposite effects on welfare. The magnitude of trade and welfare effects may differ, due to the
fact, that the effects on welfare change are not limited to terms of trade, but include allocative
efficiency and income contributions. In fact, for most of the countries, welfare decomposition
in figure 5 shows that the contributions to welfare change in terms of trade accounts for just
10 per cent, allocative effects accounts for 5 per cent and the highest contribution to welfare
change is due to income change that accounts for about 85 per cent. For France and the
United Kingdom positive contribution to welfare change in terms of trade is compensated by
the substantial contribution to welfare change of income effects and slightly by the allocative
effects. If we compare the VAT fraud values and welfare change, we can conclude that the
welfare loss is much more higher than the VAT fraud value. In fact, we have that the welfare
loss is four times (in average) higher than the VAT fraud value.

Table 4. Macroeconomic effects of VAT fraud (change w.r.t. domestic emission trading)

Regions
Belgium
France
Germany
United Kingdom
Italy
Netherlands

Real GDP (%)

Trade balance ($ millions)

Welfare ($ millions)

-0.008

333.374

-467.659

-0.003
-0.024

131.271
3589.408

-592.707
-4871.618

-0.002
-0.027

16.535
2478.734

-422.398
-3538.690

-0.015

905.845

-1215.225
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Figure 5. Welfare decomposition: equivalent variation due to various components
(change w.r.t. domestic emission trading).

4.

Legislative measures

Different legislative actions may be applied in order to reduce the GDP and welfare loss due
to the VAT fraud in the EU carbon market.
For example, given these suspected cases of fraud, the governments of Britain, France, Spain,
Netherlands and Denmark have reacted by applying a tax rate of 0%, or declaring emission
rights transfer as VAT exempt, or reversing the liability in these transactions. Most of these
national measures were not allowed under the VAT Directive at the time they were
implemented.
In the meantime, however, the VAT directive has been changed, allowing EU countries to
introduce a reverse charge for trade in emission rights. In particular, the Directive
2010/23/EC amended Directive 2006/112/EC on the common system of value added tax, as
regards an optional and temporary application of the reverse charge mechanism in relation to
supplies of certain services susceptible to fraud. This change of the VAT Directive entered
into force on April 5, 2010 (EC, 2010). In more details, the reverse charge mechanism means
that no VAT is charged by the supplier to taxable customers who, in turn, become liable for
the payment of the VAT; the buyer only, not the seller is responsible for surrendering VAT
18
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on domestically traded emissions allowances. Thus, a reverse charge system obligates the
buyer to pay the VAT on purchased allowances directly to the authorities, rather than
including the VAT in the purchase price and leaving the seller responsible for the payment of
this amount to the authorities. In practice, taxable persons with a full rights of deduction input
VAT would declare and deduct VAT at the same time without effective payment to the
treasury. These revisions enabled Member States to apply a reverse charge system
mechanism to the VAT treatment of emission allowances, a measure that, if implemented
consistently across the EU, would prevent the possibility of VAT fraud on the EU ETS.
However, this Directive only imposed the option for Member States to temporarily adopt this
regime. Since it entered into force on April 5, 2010 many Member States have failed to
implement this reverse charge system. A reverse charge will stop carousel fraud with this
specific carbon credits, but it is only effective if all EU countries apply this measure.
Otherwise, fraudsters continue to move to countries where the reverse charge measure does
not apply. Thus, cooperation and information sharing amongst European countries may be
more useful than other measures implemented for other types of fraud (Nield et al., 2011;
Wolf, 2011).
Besides, it should be noted that emissions allowances are not real physical goods, but
represent tradable dematerialized permits that exist electronically and have been created
entirely by policy. As a result the market is a contained one, since in order to own EU
emissions allowances one needs to have a registry account to electronically store them in.
There is no way that emissions allowances can escape the system, as they only exist as codes
within registry accounts and can only be traded from one registry account to another. In this
sense, this type of market is more easily controlled. As it is much more difficult for emitting
companies to be instigators of fraud, speculators (companies with no recognizable activity in
the sector) are more easily detected (Kogels, 2010; Nield et al., 2011). This calls for
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legislative measures aimed to increase the control and security of the emission trading
registry.

5.

Conclusions

The EU ETS is an important policy instrument to achieve a particular climate policy
objective such as the Kyoto obligations. But the past years have seen the VAT carousel fraud
emerges as major threats in the European carbon market. Thus, this paper has investigated the
macroeconomic effects due to the existence of tax evasion in the domestic emission trading in
five countries applying a general equilibrium analysis. Our findings show that there will be
GDP and welfare gains from the elimination of the VAT fraud in the European carbon
market. Furthermore, the application of legislative measures to eliminate this phenomena has
been discussed. As legislative measures to eliminate the VAT fraud, the reverse charge for
trade in emission rights could be applied, but, to be successfully, this requires tax law
harmonization amongst the European countries. Other legislative measures should aim to
increase the control and security of the emission trading registry.
This paper provides to the policy-makers not only a quantitative analysis, in terms of amount
of change in the macroeconomic indicators, but also a qualitative analysis, because the results
are useful for understanding the conditions and directions of legislation aimed to eliminate
the VAT fraud in the EU ETS.
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Abbreviations
- CDE = Constant Difference of Elasticity
- CDM = Clean Development Mechanism
- CES = Constant Elasticity of Substitution
- CGE = Computable General Equilibrium
- ECCP = European Climate Change Programme
- ET = Emission Trading
- EU = European Union
- EUA = European Unit Allowances
- EU ETS = European Union Emission Trading System
- GHG = Greenhouse Gas
- JI = Joint Implementation
- MAC = Marginal Abatement Costs
- NAP = National Allocation Plan
- VAT = Value Added Tax
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